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PEGGING TO THE DOLLAR AND THE EURO
1 Introduction
For small countries that have succeeded in establishing macroeconomic and fiscal stability,
nominal exchange rate stability with a currency representing an important trading partner can
be attractive. Could attempts by non-Community countries to link their currencies to the euro
have adverse consequences for EMU members by inhibiting needed real exchange rate
adjustments?  Or, to the contrary, might cooperative exchange rate links between the EMU
and selected other trading partners be beneficial?
This goal of this paper is to address these issues. We first discuss the benefits and costs to
EMU members of cooperative arrangements with such countries.  Benefits include the
potential for reducing longer-term misalignments as well as limiting short-term fluctuations
which affect economic behaviour by increasing uncertainty.  An unsustainably overvalued
exchange rate peg is a false friend, as becomes evident in the disruption accompanying the
peg’s collapse.  On the other hand, the costs to the EMU of undervaluation by pegging
countries are less likely to be severe or lasting.
To gain some insight, we initially review the experience of the United States and the various
countries that have from time to time tracked or pegged their currencies to the US dollar.  
Even though the US was not their largest trading partner, an important group of East Asian
countries formally or informally tracked the US dollar in the years up to 1997, a fact that
points to the collective dimension in exchange rate policy.  By examining the characteristics of
these countries and exploring some counterfactuals (among other things, employing
MULTIMOD) we find that the US was not strongly affected by this tracking behaviour. 
We next proceed to identify likely euro-trackers, via statistical analysis and consideration of
political/institutional factors.  Top of this list are all six of the next wave of EU accession
states as well as three other candidate states.  Other likely trackers include Malta and a number
of African countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritius, Cape Verde and the CFA zone.  Although
the EU is highly important to these countries, their collective economic size countries is small
relative to the aggregate EU economy.  However,  links with individual EU countries and
importance in certain sectors means that bilateral exchange rates are politically important.
Our analysis leads to the following policy recommendations.
The EMU should be open to active collaboration with neighbouring countries on a bilateral
basis in the field of exchange rate arrangements and related policies.   This could include
intervention support to assist policies conducive to bilateral exchange rate stability
(conditional on the pursuit of sustainable policies within an agreed framework).  Such
arrangements are likely to be most successful in the context of a flexible type of bilateral
exchange rate stability such as a target zone regime.  (The EMU should not provide open-
ended financial guarantees for a rigid currency board type arrangement).
Issues of common interest in the exchange rate and monetary field should be the subject of
regular bilateral contacts between the EMU and interested neighbouring countries and2
standing arrangements to facilitate this should be put in place.   Complementing the efforts of
the international financial institutions, the EU should offer a special contribution at the level of
technical assistance to help these countries strengthen the safety and prudential soundness of
their banking and financial sectors.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the pros and cons of
exchange rate stability from the viewpoint of the “anchor” currency zone. Section 3 turns to
consideration of the US experience with dollar trackers. We identify the countries most likely
to track the euro in section 4 and discuss the problems of “split miniblocs” and collapsing pegs
in section 5. Section 6 concludes by making recommendations, based on the preceding
analysis, regarding EMU policy towards euro trackers.
2. Pros and cons of exchange rate stability
In this section, we discuss the potential magnitude of microeconomic benefits from bilateral
exchange rate stability per se.  Many of the benefits of bilateral stability are enjoyed both by
the anchor country and the trackers but there are at least two sources of asymmetry.  First, if
one zone is much smaller than the other, exchange rate stability will be more important to the
smaller country, since it will be proportionately more heavily dependent on international trade.
 Second, if one is a net creditor to the other, changes in the exchange rate have transfer effects
between the two regions in the sense of adjusting the value of outstanding debts, posing risks
to the financial system and/or debtors.  
At a fundamental level, exchange rate uncertainty has several adverse effects.  First,
uncertainty can discourage investment, depressing the overall level of economic activity and
the rate of economic growth.   Second, in the presence of uncertainty, risk-averse firms will
set prices that are excessively high (in order to compensate for possible shocks to revenues or
costs).  Both factors lead to a reduction in international trade, since domestic transactions are
less risky than international exchanges under these conditions.  Less trade means less growth,
other things being equal (Sachs and Warner 1995).
As pointed out by Sapir, Sekkat and Weber (1994) and Sekkat (1998), it is important to
distinguish between two kinds of exchange rate variability: misalignment and volatility.  As is
confirmed in their empirical work, short-term volatility has a relatively small impact on trade
volumes (partly because of the possibility of hedging) but longer-term misalignments have a
significant adverse impact on trade activity. Misalignment can also distort the allocation of
FDI and portfolio investments.  For instance, if the Yen is unusually strong against the dollar
(and assuming that net worth constrains investment decisions and acquisition strategies),
Japanese firms will be at an advantage to US firms in bidding for dollar assets.
1  This
phenomenon was clearly evident in the late 1980s, with the Japanese engaging in an asset-
purchasing spree in US asset markets (see Froot and Stein, 1989).
An important source of currency misalignment is eliminated by a credible commitment to a
stable exchange rate, namely, market bubbles where a currency is driven higher solely on the
                                               
1 Net worth is a constraint if capital markets are imperfect (Bernanke and Gertler 1989).3
expectation of future appreciation.  Bubbles are a possibility in any asset market and are
especially prevalent in a currency market if there is no anchor to tie down a long-value for the
exchange rate.  As such, nominal exchange rate stability can help to reduce the possibility of
misalignment by providing less room for bubbles to develop.
A related argument is made by Flood and Rose (1998).  They note that the main statistical
difference between flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes is the much greater volatility of
(nominal and real) exchange rates under floating, despite the absence of any rise in volatility in
underlying macroeconomic fundamentals.  They argue that greater volatility is intrinsic to the
market microstructure of foreign exchange markets that trade floating currencies – as such,
this source of trading volatility can be eliminated, or at least much reduced, by moving to a
credible pegged exchange rate arrangement.
Exchange rate stability also has a pro-competitive effect by improving the clarity of price
signals, thereby reducing search costs for consumers in final goods markets and for firms in
purchasing intermediate goods.  The noise associated with exchange rates that fluctuate on a
daily basis makes it difficult to compare prices in different currencies, endowing local sellers
with extra market power.  In contrast, a stable exchange rate plausibly forces a closer
convergence in prices for similar goods.
Exchange rate stability can also provide benefits in the financial markets.  A credibly stable
exchange rate reduces the risk premium for foreign investors to purchase domestic assets,
deepening and making more liquid the domestic capital markets.  In the other direction,
exchange rate stability encourages domestic residents to become more active in international
capital markets, acquiring both foreign assets and liabilities.  Such integration enhances
competition in the credit market, improving borrowing terms for firms.
2  Moreover, it allows a
greater range of financial contracts to be traded, improving risk-management.  As pointed out
by Obstfeld (1994a), this can raise the long-term growth rate: diversification encourages firms
to pursue higher-risk higher-return projects, yielding a higher average, if more variable, long-
term growth rate.
These benefits notwithstanding, it is also important to point out the possible dangers in
maintaining stable exchange rates.  As documented by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Rogoff
(1998), the vast majority of exchange rate pegs ultimately collapse.  One reason is that a fixed
exchange rate does not rule out misalignment,  if the underlying monetary and fiscal policies
are inappropriate.  An unsustainable exchange rate peg can temporarily survive, if a country
has adequate reserves, employs capital controls or if market expectations are excessively
optimistic.
This last consideration is especially problematic in the case of transition economies and
emerging markets.  In these countries, economic reforms and structural transformations are
taking place and these developments in themselves may justify quite significant real
appreciation.  As such, if one observes such a country under a fixed exchange rate but
experiencing real appreciation, it is difficult to evaluate whether the real appreciation is an
                                               
2 Assuming the autarkic interest rate is above the world interest rate.4
equilibrium phenomenon, which is compatible with an exchange rate peg, or is a sign of
misalignment, rendering the peg unsustainable.  Eventually, enough evidence may accumulate
that misalignment exists and the peg ultimately collapses.
Such temporary exchange rate pegs are not innocuous.  First, if a peg is perceived to be
temporary in nature, it may distort economic behaviour: for instance, agents may bring
forward purchases of imported consumer durables in anticipation of future devaluation and the
perceived low real interest rate encourages a spending boom, generating a current account
deficit.  The peg may also cause "overborrowing" as banks and debtors are tempted to avail of
apparently cheap international credit.  Second, the ultimate collapse of a peg improves the
competitiveness of firms in the devaluing country against rivals in the anchor region.  Third,
the devaluation can cause repayment problems on loans denominated in the anchor currency,
hurting debtors but also weakening the balance sheets of the creditor financial institutions,
both in the devaluing country and in the anchor region.  We will explore in more detail the
impact of a currency collapse for the anchor and tracking countries in section 5.
The greater is the degree of international capital mobility, the more fragile the exchange rate
peg.  In the case of clearly unsustainable pegs, their demise is accelerated by the free capital
mobility, as in "first generation" models of speculative attacks.  However, as emphasised by
"second generation" models, international capital mobility may also lead to the collapse of
pegs that otherwise could be sustained (Obstfeld 1994b).  Here, the intuition is that if a
country has fundamentals that are not too strong, agents may  coordinate: if each believes
other speculators will attack the currency, he will also attack.  The attack can be self-fulfilling,
since the government, if the fundamentals are not too strong, may prefer to devalue rather
than to live with the alternative of high interest rates.  This is an example of an "unnecessary"
currency collapse, in the sense that another equilibrium path is for no speculative attack to
take place and for the peg to survive.   The lesson is that increasing financial integration makes
it harder to sustain pegged exchange rates: in the case of the CEECs, this means that,
paradoxically, efforts to satisfy EU rules on capital mobility may make it tougher to satisfy the
Maastricht requirement of ensuring exchange rate stability against the euro.
3  Lessons from US Experience
In thinking about the implications of exchange rate trackers for a large currency bloc, there
exists an obvious precedent: the US experience with dollar trackers. To identify dollar
trackers, we conducted a statistical analysis, classifying trackers as those countries that
maintained a low monthly exchange rate variance against the dollar during 1987-96.
3 This is an
ex-post classification, which may be more reliable than relying on the official classification
published in the IMF’s Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions which does not take
into account deviations from announced policies. We arrived at a compact set of East and
South-East Asian countries which, aside from oil exporters and small tourist economies,
                                               
3 Details are available from the authors upon request. We allowed for a smooth trend in the nominal
exchange rate against the dollar, to reflect differences in trend inflation or real appreciation, since we
are most interested in higher-frequency tracking of the dollar. This is the relevant concept in addressing
the question: what is the response of these countries to a surprise shift in the dollar’s value?5
represent the main countries that can be said to have tracked the US dollar.  These trackers
are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore.
This list is quite diverse in terms of size and level of  development.  However, all can be
classified as highly open to international trade and as maintaining tight fiscal policies during
the tracking period (Table 1).
Alhough their rapid growth before the 1997- crisis, and the relatively tight control they
maintained on fiscal policy are important shared characteristic (albeit to a lesser extent in the
Philippines), the Asian trackers in fact display considerable heterogeneity.   At one extreme,
Hong Kong and Singapore are city-states, have small populations and very high per capita
incomes.  At the other, Indonesia and the Philippines are relatively populous and poor
economies.  In the middle are Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand.
One common factor is that, all the countries, adjusting for differences in country size, are
highly open, as shown by their export or trade ratios.
4  However, the US is not the
predominant trading partner of these countries, suggesting that the dollar peg was not
primarily motivated by trade considerations.  On average, only 6 percent of the exports of
these countries goes to the US and only 5 1/2  percent of their imports are sourced in the US;
Japan is a more important trading partner for these countries.  Nor are these countries
especially linked to the US economy via foreign direct investment inflows (Bargas, 1997).
It is important to consider the collective incentives facing these countries, rather than just treat
them on an individual country-by-country basis.  These countries, in broad terms, produce
similar goods and are rivals as host locations for multinational investment.  As such, as an
alternative to beggar-thy-neighbour competitive depreciation strategies, exchange rate stability
against each other is an attractive collective equilibrium and one way to achieve such stability
was to track a common anchor currency, the dollar. 
This collective consideration helps to rationalize why each of these currencies chose to track
the dollar during the 1987-96 period, despite the  considerable heterogeneity in their individual
economic characteristics.
Exchange rate pegs are famously non-durable.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) show that only six
major countries with open capital markets had maintained a fixed exchange rate (defined as
fluctuations within a +/- 1 percent band) for longer than five years up to 1995: Austria, Hong
Kong, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Saudi Arabia and Thailand.  As we know, one of this
select group (Thailand) has subsequently also abandoned its peg.  The 1997 Asian currency
collapses is just the latest episode of a string in which pegged exchange rates have been
dramatically abandoned: the 1992/93 EMS currency crisis and the Mexico devaluation of
December 1994 are two other examples in the 1990s alone.
It is worth pointing out that an alternative strategy of pegging against the Yen during the
1987-96 period would have sharply increased the bilateral volatility of these currencies against
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the dollar.  However, the sharp multilateral real appreciation that occurred in line with the
strengthening dollar after mid-1995 might have been avoided.  Under dollar targeting, many of
these countries experienced significant multilateral real appreciation: in part, this may be
attributed to rapid growth in these countries  but a “fundamentals” interpretation of the 1997
currency crisis suggests that overvaluation also occurred.
Higher volatility would arguably have hampered trade and FDI relations but the
macroeconomic impact on the US would have been limited, since these countries are only
minor trading partners.  However, it is possible that higher volatility, by raising the explicit
exchange rate risk in international investment, would also have reduced the capital inflow into
these countries during the 1987-96 period and hence avoided the "overborrowing syndrome"
that contributed to the weakening of the banking and financial sectors in several of these
countries.
We employed the IMF’s quantitative macromodel MULTIMOD to verify that the significance
of these countries’ exchange rate policies for US macroeconomic behaviour is quantitatively
small.
5  Since the volume of US trade with these countries is collectively small relative to the
size of the US economy, even real exchange rate movements of these Asian countries can have
only a limited impact on the US in the context of MULTIMOD. Even in the case of a
sustained real depreciation, however, the impact is small.   In addition, MULTIMOD builds in
rapid local wage and price adjustment to nominal depreciation in developing countries, so that
nominal devaluations have little real impact.  The measured effects are so small as to be not
worth reporting in detail here. 
4 Who will track the euro?
In identifying plausible euro-trackers, we began by statistically identifying which non-EU
countries have maintained stable nominal exchange rates against the DM in recent years (using
the same methodology as for the US dollar above).  Since more countries are likely to track
the euro than might have tracked the DM, we supplemented the statistical analysis with
consideration of other factors that may influence tracking decisions.
Historic DM trackers
Only a few non-EU countries have maintained tight stability against the DM for the entire
period 1987-96.  These are: Cyprus, Cape Verde, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Norway,
Switzerland and Tunisia. This illustrates the difficulty of maintaining a peg over a long time
span, as emphasised by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Rogoff (1998).  The EMS currency
crisis episode of 1992-93 was partly responsible, since several countries adjusted their
exchange rates in response to the UK and Italian devaluations at that time.  Although relatively
few countries sustained a peg to the DM over this interval, countries may find it easier to
sustain a peg to the euro,  since individual EMU member countries no longer will be able to
engage in currency devaluations that destabilise the system.  This consideration makes the
euro a naturally more stable anchor currency than a loose DM-led EMS system.
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Taking the entire 1987-96 period, the African countries of the CFA zone would not qualify as
DM trackers (via their link to the French franc).
6 This exclusion is by dint of  the large, one-
time 50 percent devaluation of  the CFA franc in January 1994 – at all other times, stability
against the franc has been preserved.
In the most recent 1995-97 period, a larger set of countries has maintained stability against the
DM.  The list includes several EU applicant countries, namely Croatia, Cyprus, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia, and also Malta, as well as the CFA zone, Cape Verde, Estonia,
Iceland, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Norway, Switzerland and Tunisia.
The wider coverage of the euro than the DM increases its range of appeal as an anchor
currency beyond the countries that have tracked the DM, and this will be reinforced if the euro
grows as a vehicle and invoicing currency.
EU accession countries
Political and historical factors also are relevant in the tracking decision. For instance, it may be
politically easier to peg to an "international" currency such as the euro rather than to the
currency of an individual nation.   But even more clearly, those countries hoping to join the
EU in the near-term are prime candidates to be trackers of the euro – in the forefront are the
six first-wave accession countries, namely Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland and Slovenia.  A key reason is that all new members of the EU must join the monetary
union, once the Maastricht criteria are satisfied (no new opt-outs will be entertained).   Among
the Maastricht conditions is the requirement that candidate members establish a record of
stability against the euro in the prelude to joining the monetary union.
However, accession to the EU itself is not conditional on meeting the Maastricht criteria and it
not clear that a policy of strictly pegging to the euro from the outset will be an optimal
strategy for some of these countries (see Backe 1997).  Those countries that have relatively
high inflation, large current account deficits and/or weaknesses in the banking sector may
prefer to retain some short-run exchange rate flexibility, even if their medium-run goal is
membership of EMU.  Indeed, flexibility in the short-run may even enhance the credibility of
EMU as a longer-term objective, by providing the room to copper-fasten the structural
reforms that will allow these countries to participate in the EU as mature, market-orientated,
well-regulated and stable economies.  This point is reminiscent of the argument of Drazen and
Masson (1993): the policy regime must be sustainable for a commitment announcement to be
credible; an unsustainable regime is always abandoned in the end.  Pautola (1998) pushes the
argument further, stating that the priority for Eastern Europe is to complete structural
transformation and liberalisation  before participation in EMU and that a peg to the euro
would not be appropriate until this process is completed.
An alternative strategy for these countries has been proposed by Dornbusch and Giavazzi
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Senegal and Togo.8
(1998).  Conditional on having a sound banking system, they recommend a currency board
arrangement for these countries by which the local currency is fully backed by holdings of
euros.  As is well understood from the debate on currency boards, this imposes severe
restrictions: among  the costs are that, by limiting domestic credit expansion, seigniorage is
lost and the local central bank is unable to act as lender of last resort.
7 However it is precisely
the severity of the system that makes it credible.  In other words, a currency board
arrangement is analogous to a "poison pill".   The authors make this recommendation on the
basis that weaker forms of exchange rate pegs have been demonstrated by the various crisis
episodes of the 1990s to be incompatible with full capital mobility.  They argue that, rather
than devote resources to building domestic monetary institutions that can successfully control
inflation under a free float, it is better for these countries to import world-class monetary
conditions from the new euro-area.  The persuasiveness of this argument critically depends on
whether these countries have sufficiently mature financial systems and can yet afford to give
up exchange rate flexibility as a tool to deal with disinflation and external adjustment problems
in order to make a currency  board arrangement a viable proposition.
Other tracking candidates: the Mediterranean, Africa and beyond
Further possible trackers can be found in the countries around the Mediterranean Sea.  The
EU has embarked on a process of establishing closer trade and political linkages with these
countries.  Among these countries, Malta, Morocco and Tunisia have, like Cyprus, an
established history of maintaining stability against the DM and can be expected to display
similar links with the euro.
Turkey is an unlikely candidate to track the euro.  A basic obstacle is its ongoing high inflation
rate (on the order of 90 percent).  In addition, its large size and relative closedness to
international trade make it more reluctant to sacrifice its monetary autonomy.  Under the
current regime, Turkish exchange rate policy is either assigned to controlling inflation or, if
inflation is stable, to achieving external balance.
Morocco and Tunisia are the most likely of the north African countries to initially track the
euro (see also Chaffour and Stemitsiotis, 1998).  As was noted above, each has experienced
only limited currency fluctuations against the DM in recent years.  Moreover, these countries
have the strongest trade and financial linkages to the EU and their external debts are also
heavily denominated in EU currencies (28 and 22 percent respectively).  An additional reason
for these countries to track the euro is their reliance on EU customers for tourism revenues. 
That said, financial and capital account liberalisation may make it harder in the future for these
countries to sustain exchange rate pegs.
The other North African countries are at present unlikely to have stable exchange rates against
the euro.  Generally speaking, these countries still face the challenge of structural reform and
have smaller trade linkages with the EU.  The political situation in several of these countries is
also not amenable to monetary stability.  Finally, several of these countries are heavily
dependent on oil or other commodities for export revenues.  Since these commodities are
                                               
7 This latter restriction means that a sound banking system is a prerequisite for a successful currency
board arrangement.9
priced in dollars, the euro may not be the natural anchor currency for any exchange rate
commitment.
8
As mentioned, the CFA zone, comprising African countries with close economic and cultural
links to France, will be tied to the euro.  However, the 50 percent devaluation of the CFA
franc in 1994 has inevitably raised the question of whther this peg might be subject to
occasional large realignments. 
Among other African nations, most currently have independently floating exchange rates.  In
most cases, the countries have no choice in the sense that the economic fundamentals are too
weak to sustain any significant exchange rate commitment.  (Though Lesotho, Namibia and
Swaziland peg to the South African rand, in effect forming a regional exchange rate system.)
Both Cape Verde and Mauritius have a history of maintaining stability against the DM
(officially, Cape Verde pegs to a currency basket and Mauritius has a managed float).  The
openness of these economies increase the attractiveness of stable exchange rates and both
countries have experienced steady growth rates and relatively low inflation.
9 As other African
economies stabilise and liberalise trade, external anchors for monetary policy may become
more attractive and exchange rate stability may be more feasible.
The group of former British colonies may also find a euro peg more attractive if and when the
United Kingdom joins EMU.  These countries retain strong trade and cultural linkages to
Britain and UK membership would both make the euro a more suitable anchor currency and
have a positive demonstration effect on policymakers in these countries.
Finally, those Latin American and Asian countries that target a basket of currencies will likely
give a greater weight to the euro in the composition of these baskets.  However, this effect
will be relatively minor, since Europe will still be a less significant trading partner than the US
or Japan for most of these countries.
Strategic interaction between countries
The analysis of the US dollar case showed that there is no unique set of characteristics that
identify currency trackers.  The group of Asian countries that tracked the dollar during the
1987-96 period exhibited a wide range of structural and macroeconomic characteristics and
the US was not even the main trading partner for these countries.  Rather, that case study
illustrates the importance of viewing exchange rate arrangements in a collective fashion: the
decision of any one Asian country to peg against the dollar cannot be taken in isolation from
the decisions made by the other countries.  Indeed, among a set of countries that are rivals in
international trade, exchange rate commitments are strategic complements – if country A pegs
to the dollar, it is then more attractive for countries B and C also to fix their exchange rates
against the dollar.
This reasoning is helpful in thinking about the potential set of countries that may opt to track
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currency value of emigrant remittances.10
the euro.  Already, the CFA zone is a set of countries that has made a collective decision to
peg to the euro (in succession to a peg to the French franc).  Similarly, the CEECs and
Mediterranean countries will, at least in part, be influenced by each other in whether or not to
track the euro.  Indeed, this leads to an interesting indeterminacy: one equilibrium path may be
for countries A, B and C to track the euro but it may also be an equilibrium for none to track
the euro.  This raises the possibility of a coordination failure: although all may prefer to track
the euro, so long as the others also track the euro, it requires coordination (or one country to
take the lead) in order to achieve this outcome.
It is also worth pointing out a dynamic consideration.  Imagine only a small set of countries
initially tracks the euro.  Over time, neighbouring countries will compare their performance to
that of the trackers: if it appears that the trackers are performing relatively well, this
encourages other countries to learn from their example and switch to euro-tracking.
Country characteristics
Of course, individual country characteristics also matter. Based on the preceding analysis, we
list in Table 2 the countries that we consider to be the most likely candidates to be euro
trackers in the medium-term (say 2003), together with some of their macroeconomic
characteristics.  As with the dollar trackers, many of the candidate euro-trackers are highly
open countries with well-managed public finances.  Some of the countries already have quite
low inflation but the process of disinflation is not yet complete for others.  The most
questionable macroeconomic feature is that some countries have quite large current account
deficits.  However the final column shows that total external debt levels are quite moderate for
these countries, so that significant current account deficits are more "affordable" than for
countries with larger outstanding stocks of external liabilities.
It is worth making the point that, relative to the US case, the euro is a more natural anchor for
the these countries than the dollar was for the Asian countries.  Moreover, again in contrast to
the US case, the close political relationship between the EU and these countries makes
tracking a more feasible proposition.
As a memorandum item, their current exchange rate arrangements are summarised in Table 3.
As is evident from the table, these countries possess a variety of formal exchange rate systems:
ranging from currency board arrangements to managed floats.
Although the aggregate GDP of the group is equivalent to about 14.5% of the EU total, and
although the EU is a very large trading partner for each of these countries, none of the
countries is a large trading partner of the EU as a whole (Table 4).  Of course, as we will
argue in the next section, the bilateral trade between some of these countries and individual
EU countries or regions may be quite significant and/or these countries may be a large player
in individual sectors or industries.
5  Further aspects of policy towards exchange-rate stability
The problem of split miniblocs11
Our discussion has focussed on relationships between potential euro-trackers and the EMU-
area as a whole.  But the regions and countries that form the EMU are economically diverse
both in the sectoral composition of their production and in the geographical distribution of
their trading and financial linkages.  As a result, the exchange rate relationship between certain
outside countries and the euro can have a much greater impact on certain insider regions than
on others.  Trade and financial linkages that appear modest on an EMU-wide basis can be of
regional importance.  In short, the particular bilateral euro rate of most interest to individual
EMU regions differs from region to region.
One way of expressing this issue is to picture the economic interrelationships involving EMU
regions and their trading and economic partners as forming clusters (or "mini-blocs").  Where
a cluster includes regions both within and outside the EMU, exchange rate movements
between members of the cluster or minibloc assume importance.  Even if average welfare in
the EMU as a whole is not much affected by such movements, welfare in the regions
belonging to the cluster are affected.  This is what has been referred to as the problem of "split
miniblocs" in Honohan (1997).
To the extent that the outsider countries involved in such split miniblocs are small, there is
clearly a potential for a bilateral exchange rate policy involving the euro and that currency to
be in operation, without disturbing the overall exchange rate policy for the euro.  Indeed, we
may assume that there will be some political pressure from producer interests in the affected
regions for precisely such a policy, if the outsider currency shows a tendency to depreciate
unduly.
The most obvious practical issue is the question of avoiding real misalignments and more
generally smoothing bilateral euro exchange rates.  Where EMU participants and the outsider
in question have a common interest in stabilizing a particular bilateral exchange rate, there is a
prima facie case for considering institutional arrangements to achieve such stability.  It does
not, however, follow that the degree of concern about any given bilateral exchange rate is
always the same on the part of outsiders and insiders.  For example, an outsider may be able to
shift part of the burden of a real supply shock onto EMU members by allowing an adjustment
in the real exchange rate.  In this way, the impact of an asymmetric shock hitting one minibloc
more than the rest of the EMU can be greatly amplified, so far as the EMU members of the
minibloc are concerned.  If bilateral exchange rate policy can be used to insulate or hedge
these shocks, that will be a useful offset to the adverse side-effects of currency union
membership.
10
Analysis of trade patterns points to at least seven clusters of closely-trading countries among
the EU, EEA and pre-accession countries, of which four will be split by the establishment of
the EMU (Honohan, 1997).   A degree of real exchange rate stability within each cluster could
help insulate the participant country from some real shocks hitting the cluster as a whole, but
                                               
10 A theoretical analysis is in Honohan (1997).  Such arrangements can also alleviate the problem,
identified by von Hagen and Süppel (1994), whereby the differing objective functions of different
members may not be optimally reconciled by a preset Central Bank constitution.12
asymmetric with regard to the rest of the EMU.  This is one basis for considering these
clusters as potential mini-blocs.  Other more subtle linkages are evidently present, as is evident
for example in the correlated banking crises of the Nordic countries.
The four miniblocs split by the EMU are:
Insular   This minibloc is formed of two EU (Ireland and the UK) members, one of which has
opted out of early EMU participation.  The UK is an important export destination for other
countries too (Cyprus, Iceland, Norway), but only Ireland bulks significantly in UK exports as
well.   Nevertheless, Ireland is clearly the dependent partner in this minibloc.  Because of the
asymmetry of this minibloc, and the size of the UK economy, it would be unrealistic to assume
that Ireland's vulnerability to UK exchange rate shocks would be influential in determining UK
exchange rate policy with regard to the euro.
Nordic This minibloc, including all the Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden
and Finland), accounts for between 17 and 20 per cent of its participants' exports, except for
Iceland (an exporting-only member), which exports about 12 per cent within the minibloc.  All
of these countries have at least 55 per cent of their exports within the EU.  (These countries
also have strong trading links with the UK, and the within-minibloc share of the Nordic
countries would rise to a minimum of 26 per cent if the UK were included).
Central European  This group (most of whose members also trade disproportionately with
Germany) includes the important Czech-Slovak sub-group, together with Austria and Slovenia
(which also exports strongly to Italy, included in a different minibloc).  With their unit labour
costs likely to remain much lower for many years to come, and their current and prospective
emphasis on price-sensitive export products, the Czech Republic and Slovakia may, as they
climb the quality scale, become increasingly important competitors for Austria and parts of
Germany, giving rise to concern about any competitive devaluation.  On the other hand, their
proven vulnerability to currency speculation could make them interested in cooperative
arrangements with the euro area that could help them resist such pressure.
Mediterranean  The Italian minibloc includes Malta and Romania, which are dependent
exporting-only partners.  Italy is an importing-only member, but for Malta in particular - a
third of whose exports go to Italy - the exchange rate issue will be an important one.  Malta’s
position is also strongly influenced by the tourist trade, within which there is a different pattern
of interdependency, as Cyprus and Malta compete with each other, and with Greece, Spain,
Portugal and Italy (along with other countries not included in our set) as Mediterranean sun
holiday destinations.  As such, one begins to recognize a common interest in the sun resorts of
the latter countries to ensure that none of the island destinations indulge in competitive
depreciation.
Although historical experience does not support the idea of a fixed or systematic relationship
between the currencies of our miniblocs, and although trade patterns are no doubt endogenous
to the exchange rate regime (and will evolve under other pressures too, especially in the
transition economies), the identified miniblocs suggest the likely focus of concerns about
bilateral exchange rates of the euro.  Casting a wider net, some additional dependencies can be13
foreseen, especially in regard to the tourist trade, with Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey
sectorally important competitors for coastal regions of Portugal, Spain and possibly France
and Italy.
If the euro is likely to be a peg or at least the major reference point for many fringe currencies,
and if there are significant interests within the EMU area anxious to minimize the amount of
competitive depreciation undertaken by minibloc partners, then there is an a priori case for
opening the possibility of collaborative arrangements between the EMU and the fringe.
Collapsing Pegs
The termination of an exchange rate peg (which, as mentioned, appears to be almost
inevitable, if history is to be a guide) typically takes the form of a discrete collapse, often
triggered by a speculative attack.
11 Moreover, the ongoing Asian crisis illustrates that
exchange rate collapses can take place in a "wave", with a number of countries devaluing
within a short time interval.
12 
The abandonment of a peg by an (implicit or explicit) tracker can affect the anchor country via
a number of mechanisms.  At a macro level, the expenditure-switching effect of devaluation
will reduce demand for imports from the anchor country and raise the supply of exports to the
anchor country.  The decline in import demand may be compounded by a contraction in
aggregate demand in the devaluing country, since devaluation may be accompanied by a
capital outflow and the introduction of a fiscal austerity programme.
13  In the case of the Asia
crisis, trade linkages with the US and Europe are small (the average of merchandise exports
and imports was in the 1.5-3 percent range in 1996) so that the macroeconomic impact of the
Asian currency collapses via such trade-related mechanisms is necessarily limited.
Devaluation also has sectoral trade implications.  Firms in the anchor country that compete
with rivals from the devaluing country suffer a sharp loss of competitiveness and may
experience a reduction in profitability and/or a decline in market share.  This effect will be
more important the more similar are the anchor and devaluing countries, in terms of sectors of
specialization and the production quality levels.  In contrast, if the countries are dissimilar in
the sense of specializing in different industries then this effect will be small, since few firms in
the anchor country will be directly competing with firms from the devaluing country.  In
reference to the Asian crisis, producers in those countries typically produce lower-quality
goods and in different sectors than firms in the US and Europe and so there is relatively little
                                               
11 In many cases, the speculative attack just accelerates the collapse of a peg that is in terminal decline.
Traders recognise that the collapse is inevitable, either because the fixed exchange rate is directly
inconsistent with another policy stance (e.g., money-financed fiscal deficits) or because the government
is politically compelled to relax monetary policy (e.g., due to a recession or fragility in the financial
sector). However, recent research (so-called "second generation" models of speculative attacks)
suggests that speculation in itself can sometimes force the collapse of a peg that is otherwise viable.
Even in this case, however, the fundamentals must be already weak for such an attack to take place.
See Flood and Marion (1998) for a review of this literature.
12 See Corsetti et al. (1998) for an account of the Asian crisis.
13 Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) document that currency collapses are typically associated with a
sharp domestic recession.14
direct sectoral competition.
The anchor country gains via an improved terms of trade.  Lower prices on goods exported by
the devaluing country allow a greater volume of purchases and place downward pressure on
the domestic price level.  In turn, the alleviation of inflation pressures enables the central  bank
of the anchor country to maintain a lower interest rate than would otherwise be possible. 
Again, this effect depends on the extent of trade linkages between the anchor and devaluing
countries.
With respect to the capital account,  devaluation is often  accompanied by an initial capital
outflow from the devaluing country.  This enlarges the pool of capital available to investors in
the anchor country, placing further downward pressure on the domestic interest rate.  On the
other side, devaluation also raises the attractiveness of foreign direct investment in the
devaluing country by firms based in the anchor country for two reasons.  One is a wealth
effect: anchor country firms will be able to outbid cash-constrained local firms in the devaluing
country and hence purchase assets at "fire-sale" prices.  The other is that real depreciation
reduces relative production costs in the devaluing country and hence may tempt an anchor
country firm to switch some of its labour-intensive activities to the foreign location.
 14  This
raises a potential distribution issue since low-skilled workers in the anchor country now face
more intense competition from the workforce in the devaluing country.
There are fiscal effects also, though too much can be made of the adverse effects of the
automatic translation effect of the devaluation on the local currency value of the official
foreign debt.  The government’s nominal tax revenues should recover strongly if the
devaluation increases the volume of imports and more generally its ability to finance the
foreign debt will be enhanced if real economic activity expands in response to devaluation.
Finally, devaluation can affect the financial and banking systems. spilling over to the anchor
country, especially when its banks have been active in lending to borrowers in the devaluing
country, whether in domestic or in foreign currency.  Banking crises often accompany
currency crises, especially where banks’ clients have unhedged foreign currency liabilities.
15 
This in turn can increase the exposure of anchor currency banks who have lent to the
devaluer’s banks.  If banks in the anchor country are already weak, rising bad debts owed by
entities in the devaluing country may force a curtailment in even domestic credit activity, in an
effort to rebuild balance sheets.  It has been suggested that this negative spillover effect may
be currently operative in Japan, whose banks have significant liabilities in the Asian crisis
countries.  However, European and US banks are currently enjoying strong profits and so can
more easily absorb losses on their Asian liabilities. 
More generally, if investors in the anchor country own assets in the devaluing country, they
will suffer a negative wealth shock from any decline in the devaluing country's stock and real
estate markets.  This of course is the downside of cross-border investment and its costliness
                                               
14 See Froot and Stein (1989), Klein and Rosengren (1992), Goldberg and Klein (1998), Krugman
(1998).
15 See Goldfajn and Valdes (1997), Chang and Velasco (1998), Miller (1998), Obstfeld (1998). The
relationship is bidirectional: problems in the banking sector may be the trigger for devaluation.15
should be judged in the context of the shared gains when the asset markets in the foreign
country are performing well.
The disruptions associated with a currency collapse may also prompt international labour
flows.  In the case of the 1994 Mexico episode, rapid assistance was offered by the US, at
least in part motivated by fear of a sharp inflow of migrants crossing the border from Mexico
to the US.  In contrast, the threat of increased illegal immigration flows from the Asian crisis
countries into the US is remote.
Finally, it is again important to note the potential importance of collective devaluations, well
illustrated by the Asian crisis.
16 Although the abandonment of a peg by any one country is a
comparatively minor event, the impact becomes greater when a entire region is shocked by a
wave of currency collapses.   Allowing for such systemic risk is important, for instance, in the
lending decisions of international banks if the financial sectors in the lending countries are to
be protected.  The regional nature of the crisis also introduces strategic political
considerations.  Although the US has not been much directly affected by the crisis, concerns
for stability in Asia and the health of the Japanese banking system has arguably persuaded the
Federal Reserve Bank not to implement the interest rate increases warranted by domestic
macroeconomic conditions. 
Correlated currency collapses can be explained by a number of factors.  Clearly common
disturbances are important: two good examples are the German unification shock in the EMS
case, the depreciation of the Yen against the dollar in the Asian case.  Shared policy mistakes
are another source, such as the failure of some of the Asian countries to adequately regulate
their financial sectors in the wake of capital account liberalization.
17
However, contagion effects also play a role.  A working definition of contagion is that
devaluation by country A raises the likelihood that country B will also devalue.  Contagion has
both rational and irrational forms.  Along the rational dimension, a devaluation by country A
weakens the competitive position of rival firms in country B and so places pressure on country
B to engage in a matching devaluation.  This mechanism clearly has been in operation in the
Asian episode.
18 More generally, Glick and Rogoff (1998) find that trade relationships do a far
better job than other factors (such as similarity in macroeconomic conditions) in explaining
patterns of contagion in a large sample of currency crisis episodes since the early 1970s.
19
The microstructure of international financial markets can also generate contagion effects.  If a
crisis in country A prompts investors to withdraw savings from regional-based mutual funds,
the mutual fund companies will have to sell its regional holdings in order to raise the cash to
meet redemptions.  Similarly, portfolio allocation models may be built around regional
                                               
16 Similarly, the EMS 1992/93 currency crisis involved multiple countries.
17 In a comprehensive study, the IMF (1998) finds that real appreciation and growth in bank lending are
the two best predictors of financial and currency crises.
18 Indeed, some observers trace the origins of the crisis to the 1994 Chinese devaluation. However, there
is now a consensus that the effective magnitude of this devaluation has been overstated, since a large
share of Chinese trade did not take place at the official exchange rate.  See Fernald et al. (1998).
19 See also Rigobon (1998).16
strategies such that a "sell" signal applies to the regional in general.  In addition, as shown by
Calvo and Mendoza (1997), costly information acquisition and broad international
diversification combine to make investors highly sensitive to negative rumours about a
country's prospects.  In turn, a panic-driven capital outflow can prompt a country to devalue
in the face of a liquidity crisis.  Such a panic is all the more potent when a country has a lot of
foreign currency liabilities (such as Thailand, Indonesia and Korea) since the domestic
monetary authority can only act as a lender of last resort with respect to domestic currency
liabilities.
20 In this way, a general panic about prospects for Asia can force devaluations even
by countries that could otherwise have sustained a stable exchange rate.
In summary, the termination of exchange rate pegs, especially collective collapses, can have
important feedback effects on the anchor country.  Due to limited trade relationships, the US
has escaped relatively lightly from the Asian crisis.  However, to some extent, this was a
matter of good timing: a booming domestic economy and a cyclically profitable banking sector
has provided insulation that Japan, for example, lacks.  Moreover, even if the direct impact has
been limited, regional political considerations has induced the US to moderate its interest rate
policy, possibly at the expense of future domestic price stability.  The EMU needs to be aware
of the risks posed by currency collapses on the part of potential peggers to the euro.
6   Policy Options
Costs and benefits
In section 4, we identified a substantial group of countries that are likely to target the euro.
How should the EMU respond? One option is to pursue a US-style “benign neglect” strategy
by which the behaviour of bilateral exchange rates are a matter of indifference for the EMU. 
For several reasons, this may be a suboptimal response.  At the most basic level, non-
intervention with respect to exchange rates may be at the price of later larger-scale
interventions to cope with the consequences of a particularly unstable bilateral exchange rate.
For instance, the necessity for sizeable US financial aid to Mexico in the wake of its 1994
devaluation and to Asia during 1997-98 may in part have its roots in earlier neglect of these
key bilateral exchange rates.   But in addition, as already discussed, exchange rate stability is
attractive to the EMU, especially those parts of it with significant linkages with potential
tracker countries.  For instance, the tourism industries of Spain, Portugal and Italy would be
damaged if the currencies of rival sun destinations such as Cyprus, Malta, Morocco and
Tunisia were to depreciate against the euro.
Since many of the tracker countries have close political ties to the EU and several are potential
EU members, the EMU will also want to take into account diplomatic issues in evaluating the
benefits of exchange rate stability: thus if arrangements for stability are in the interest of the
tracker countries, the EU may be able to offer something on this front to ease other diplomatic
issues.  Indeed, since the trackers are heavily dependent on EU trade, the benefits of stability
are plausibly much larger for these countries than for the EU.  In particular, for these
countries, a stable exchange rate is important not only for smooth trade relations but also for
                                               
20 See also Radelet and Sachs (1998).17
overall monetary stability.
The fact that the group of potential trackers are collectively small in terms of their of
aggregate economic size actually limits the risks involved in such bilateral arrangements.  This
provides EMU with considerable latitude in pursuing bilateral exchange rate stability since any
required foreign exchange interventions would not have a significant impact on the aggregate
euro money supply.   (In particular, there is much less danger of such a policy destabilizing the
EMU than was present for the Bundesbank in agreeing to the intervention arrangements of the
EMS.)  Since monetary aggregates would not be threatened, supporting bilateral stability is
consistent with the mandate of the ECB to pursue price stability as its primary objective.
Our conclusion is that the potential benefits of arrangements to promote bilateral exchange
rate stability with at least some of these countries are not negligible.  The risks and costs can
be contained to an acceptable minimum by careful choice of policy design.
Bilateral support and conditionality
In order to capitalize on the opportunity for constructive collaboration with these countries, a
standing administrative arrangement should therefore be set up with a view to establishing
formal and regular bilateral consultations between the EMU and interested countries.  The
bilateral arrangements could evolve from consultations to more formal agreements to
collaborate in relation to exchange rate policy.
Of course, we do not recommend that the EMU provide open-ended or unconditional
intervention support for bilateral exchange rates with the tracker countries.  Any such
commitment would generate an obvious moral hazard problem in that a tracker country may
believe that lax domestic policies will be “forgiven” by EMU foreign exchange support. 
However, the problem of moral hazard is diminished by the fact that the tracker countries have
every incentive to maintain good political relations with the institutions of the EU and
therefore will be reluctant to abuse any support offered by the EMU.  The moral hazard
problem has more force with respect to the actions of private agents, who may pursue riskier
borrowing strategies in the belief that a bail-out will be forthcoming in the event of adverse
economic developments.
Rather, intervention support should be provided only in a situation in which a tracker country
is following sustainable policies.  Indeed, a country that follows policies that are inconsistent
with a peg to the euro should be encouraged to readjust its exchange rate in timely fashion.
The alternative of a peg that must ultimately collapse is an undesirable situation, since
temporary pegs distort production and spending decisions and a discrete currency collapse has
a sharp adverse impact on asset prices, creditworthiness and macroeconomic stability.
Sustainability refers not only to sound monetary and fiscal policies but also involves adequate
regulation of the financial sector.  Excessive lending in domestic currency may require the
domestic central bank to exercise its lender of last resort function.  Excessive borrowing in
foreign currency raises exposure to speculative attack.  As such, the sustainability of an
exchange rate peg requires the maintenance of a healthy banking and general financial sector.
In this regard, one method by which the EMU can promote exchange rate stability is through18
the provision of technical assistance in helping tracker countries develop adequate financial
regulation systems.
Sound monetary and fiscal policies in the tracker countries can be promoted by the proposed
regular bilateral meetings between the EMU and trackers, which would provide the EMU with
a forum to express its opinion on the macroeconomic policies pursued by the tracking
countries.  The right of the EMU to express an opinion on these policy choices is in effect the
price that must be paid by the trackers in exchange for the promise of intervention support. An
external evaluation can help to clarify the policy choices each country faces.  In addition, it
may be politically helpful to appeal to EU opinion in persuading domestic actors of the
necessity of sound macroeconomic policies.  That said, it is important that any policy advice is
communicated in diplomatic fashion, in order to avoid the perception that domestic policies
are being externally imposed by the EMU and the purpose is not to replicate the IMF’s
surveillance role.
If a tracker country follows sustainable policies, why might intervention support still be
required in order to ensure exchange rate stability? As "second generation" models of currency
crises make clear, there is a range of fundamentals for which self-fulfilling speculative attacks
are possible.  This provides the rationale for EMU intervention: namely, in order to forestall
such “unnecessary” currency crises.  The message of this literature is that an economy that is
temporarily weak is vulnerable to a speculative attack and may opt to devalue, even though no
devaluation would take place in the absence of the attack.  The promise of EMU intervention
under such circumstances would deter speculators and help maintain such sustainable pegs.
Cooperation and coordination among trackers
The issue also arises as to whether cooperation between sub-groups of trackers could also be
beneficial (both the the trackers and to the EMU), particularly by reducing the risk of
competitive devaluations.  After all, there could be a kind of contagion, whereby if one partner
country devalues, the incentive and pressure for others to devalue is greater.  Such and
externality among prospective trackers (who compete with each other on European markets)
could exacerbate exchange rate movements which are unwanted from the EMU’s point of
view.  Hence the cooperative arrangements that can be envisaged might be more effective if
they embodied arrangements between the "spokes" and not only between the "spokes" and the
"hub".
In this context it is worth bearing in mind that the creation of a large euro zone raises the
stakes of a competitive devaluation by an outsider – greater than was the case for devaluations
in the EMS with its smaller core.
Financial sector stability
It is important to the EMU to avoid unnecessary currency collapses.  Aside from the disruption
of international trade, the Asian episode has vividly demonstrated that a currency attack can
result in a liquidity crisis in the financial sector, as creditors all rush to reclaim their assets
prior to a devaluation.  This panic equilibrium is costly all round, including for creditors.  In the
euro context, many foreign creditors are likely to be EU banks or funds and so there is a
justification to avoid liquidity crises by supplementing the lender of last resort function of a19
central bank under a peg with  the promise of EMU foreign exchange intervention.  In the
event of an incipient financial panic, an additional step that could be taken by the EMU would
be attempt to coordinate the actions of EU creditors.  This would help to avoid the “scramble
for the exit” by which individual creditors seek to ensure repayment, even though it is in their
collective self-interest to avoid the forced liquidation of efficient long-term investment
projects.  The existence of this negative spillover in creditor actions justifies efforts to organize
a coordinated, orderly response to financial crises.  The recent intervention by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York in the LTCM crisis provides a useful illustration.  No public
money was offered: rather, the role of the bank was to facilitate coordination among the
creditor institutions in order to ensure that LTCM’s investment positions were not inefficiently
unwound.
Type of exchange rate arrangement
Regarding the precise nature of exchange rate arrangements between the EMU and trackers, it
is true that ERMII offers a general framework; however, it is too broad to be useful for
countries seeking a tighter arrangement.  Some countries may, as already noted, wish to enter
into a currency board arrangement.   Even if this a preferred option, it is doubtful that that the
EMU should enter into a formal agreement to support any currency board.  It is not only that
this could entail a much larger financial commitment, but that such an agreement would
introduce an element of moral hazard almost surely fatal to the logic of a currency board,
based as it is on imposing a severe policy constraint.
But support could be provided for a more flexible form of exchange rate tracking.  One
attractive form is a “target zone” system (Williamson, 1985), allowing a soft margin of
fluctuation around the targeted path.  For a country that wishes to match the inflation of the
euro zone and does not face the prospect of real appreciation, the target path would be stable;
otherwise the target path for exchange rate could allow for trend movements. For example, a
country that has similar inflation to the euro zone but expects trend real appreciation may want
to allow the target exchange rate to smoothly appreciate over time.  Conversely, a country
that has trend inflation far above the euro zone average may want to allow for trend nominal
depreciation.  Over time, such a country could gradually disinflate by progressively reducing
the rate of “crawl” in the target.
A target zone arrangement avoids the rigidity problems inherent in tighter arrangements.  The
zone provides an anchor for expectations by indicating the trading range desired by the
domestic and EMU monetary authorities.  If a currency drifts away from its target par value,
countervailing monetary policy can return the exchange rate towards the middle of the range. 
If the drift is large enough, domestic action may need to be supplemented by EMU
intervention in order not to threaten the level of external reserves.  Indeed, the promise of
intervention in itself will be enough to forestall a certain amount of destabilising speculative
activity.
In addition to allowing room for some speculative volatility in the exchange rate, a target zone
also allows flexibility in adjusting to temporary asymmetric shocks.  A good example would be
a liquidity problem in the banking sector, requiring a temporary monetary expansion.  Of
course, in the event of a permanent real shock, the target par value could be adjusted, shifting20
the centre of the band.  Such adjustments would not be possible under the alternative of an
inflexible currency board arrangement.
It may be better to enter into such target zone arrangements on a bilateral basis.   The problem
with a multilateral system is that recalibration of target paths requires collective action.  The
inherent coordination difficulties make the adjustment process more cumbersome and may
introduce “hold-up” problems by which a change in target requested by one country is
opposed by others that fear competitiveness losses.  Moreover, the set of tracker countries
may not display the internal political cohesion to ensure that such a multilateral system
operates to maximise the common good.  Finally, a multilateral system could diminish the
influence of the EMU relative to a set of bilateral arrangements between the EMU and
individual tracker countries.
If the EMU enters into a bilateral arrangement with a tracker country, it will want to negotiate
the target path with the tracker to avoid both initial and subsequent misalignments, whether
overvaluation or undervaluation.   An overvalued exchange rate is to be avoided because slow
growth in the tracking country is not in the interest of the EU, especially in the case of the
accession group that aspires to EU membership.  Moreover, an overvalued currency may
ultimately lead to a currency collapse and the EU will suffer along with the tracking country in
the wake of such a crisis.
It must be stressed that any such arrangement should not preclude adjustments in the case of
misalignment (in particular because the transition process and therefore the path to EU
accession itself requires flexibility).  After all, the objective should not be primarily to export
the monetary credibility of the EMU to non-participants, but to defend these countries against
speculative attacks and eliminate some unnecessary exchange rate volatility.  Indeed, in
determining any formal agreement, the shared objectives of the agreement, will have be clearly
stated to avoid divergent and contradictory understandings that could cause the arrangement
to unravel.21
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Table 1.  Dollar Trackers: Summary table of core characteristics








Hong Kong 22,290   6.19 137,975       151.52
Indonesia      980       193.28 189,414 -0.23 26.98
Korea   9,700 44.85 435,045 0.79 33.59
Malaysia   3,890 20.14 174,466 -0.26       102.70
Philippines   1,050 68.60         72,030 -0.91 40.26
Singapore 26,730   2.99    78,846 12.87       170.50
Taiwan 12,395 21.30  262,978 3.22 81.84
Thailand   2,740 58.24  159,578 0.433 44.54
Note: GNP, population and trade/GDP ratios are based on 1995 data. Fiscal balance (as a ratio to GDP) is
average over 1990-96. Macroeconomic data were obtained from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators CD-ROM. Taiwanese macroeconomic data came from Taiwan's  Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
Table 4.  EU trade with likely trackers, 1995
Imports Exports
ECU million  % of EU total ECU million  % of EU total  
Iceland 920 0.17 793 0.14
Norway 25442 5.26 17330 3.13
Malta 1077 0.14 2015 0.3
Cyprus 737 0.1 2013 0.3
Czech Republic 8992 1.68 11653 2.24
Hungary 9611 1.52 8728 1.6
Poland 12251 2.11 15294 3.18
Slovenia 4245 0.74 5178 0.86
Slovakia 3091 0.59 3192 0.64
Estonia 889 0.19 1348 0.27
Latvia 1126 0.19 940 0.18
Lithuania 970 0.19 1016 0.23
Tunisia 3352 0.63 4153 0.69
Morocco 4017 0.73 4728 0.75
CFA
Cape Verde
Mauritius 1020 0.19 651 0.09
                  Source: Eurostat.25












Iceland  ‹ 7.1 0.3 23.5 69.6 31.8 -0.3** 0.7
Norway 146.0 4.4 33.2 70.7 38.3 0.7** 7.5
Malta  ‹ 3.4 0.4 8.3 197.7 101.4 -0.5** -0.1
Cyprus  ‹ 8.9 0.7 12.7 99.3 35.4 0.1** -0.1
Czech Republic 44.8 10.3 4.4 107.8 60.3 -2.1 -6.3
Hungary 43.7 10.2 4.3 67.2 54.9 -4.6 -3.9
Poland 117.7 28.6 4.1 53.4 30.6 -1.7 -2.8
Slovenia 18.5 1.9 9.8 112.6 66.4 -1.2 0.2
Slovakia  ‹ 17.4 5.4 3.2 123.8 47.2 -4.9 -12.0
Estonia 3.8 1.5 2.5 159.8 76.9 2.4 -5.1
Latvia 5.7 2.5 2.3 90.8 47.5 1.4 -6.9
Lithuania 7.1 3.7 1.9 107.8 36.6 -1.9 -10.2
Tunisia 18.0 8.9 2.0 93.3 54.4 0.5** -3.4
Morocco 32.4 27.6 1.2 62.2 35.3 0.2** -1.7
CFA* 42.8 91.9 0.5 55.6 26.1 NA -0.1
Cape Verde* 0.4 0.4 1.0 43.3 37.4 NA -7.7
Mauritius* 4.3 1.1 3.8 78.8 55.8 NA 0.01
         Sources:GDP and  population from World Bank database, 1995. Openness is the sum of exports and imports as a %  of  GDP from IMF database, 1996..
EU openness is the sum of exports to and imports from the EU as a % of GDP calculated from Eurostat and IMF data.
Fiscal balance data refers to 1997.   Source: IMF, except **1995: Source: World Bank
Current account and inflation data from IMF  website, and refers to 1997; except  ‹  1996: Source World Bank
Fiscal balance and current account data expressed as ratios to  GDP . External debt data from the Bank for International Settlements for December 1997.
*All CFA, Mauritius and Cape Verde data from IMF International Financial Statistics, March 1998.26






Iceland Pegged to basket Basket of 16 countries, 10 of which are EU
members.
+/-6%
Norway Managed floating Determined by market forces but the central bank intervenes to maintain stability.
 During 1998 authorities announced free float “in the short term”
Malta Fixed peg Basket: ECU (67%) , US$ (21%), £ (12%)  +/-0.25%
Cyprus Fixed peg ECU +/-2.25%
Czech
Republic
Managed float On May 27, 1997, the central bank was forced to abandon a +\-7.5% fluctuation
band against a basket including the DM (65%) and the US$ (35%).
Hungary Crawling peg Basket: DM (70%), US$ (30%) +/-2.25% Mid-point of the band is devalued monthly by 0.9% against the basket.
Poland Crawling peg Basket: US$ (45%), DM (35%), £ (10%),
CHF (5%), FRF (5%)
+/-10% Mid-point of the band is devalued monthly by 0.8% against the basket.
Slovenia Managed float De facto shadowing of DM, combined with
real exchange rate rule




DM +/-3% Current regime was introduced in June 1992.  The small fluctuation band
represents a deviation from strict theoretical currency board concept.
Latvia Fixed peg SDR The exchange rate has been pegged to the SDR since February 1994
Lithuania Currency board US$ 0% Currency board was introduced in April 1994
Tunisia Managed floating Determined in interbank market
Morocco Pegged to basket Basket based on main trade partners Rates for most currencies based on relationship with French franc
CFA Pegged to French
franc
Cape Verde Pegged to basket
Mauritius Managed floating
Source: Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman, 1998.